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The hidden power of corporations
A lesson from China
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Mao Zedong famously said that “political power grows out of
the barrel of a gun.”1 As he was someone who looked to the
Russian Revolution for inspiration while engaged in a war to
liberate his country from Japanese occupation, his view was
understandable. Yet power can be exerted in different ways and
can be most effective when it is hidden, with decisions made
behind closed doors, or even invisible, so that the decisions one
person makes are influenced by another without them realising
it.2
The growing literature on what are termed “the commercial
determinants of health” pays particular attention to the hidden
and invisible forms of power, whereby large corporations use
various methods to shape thinking about what are appropriate
responses to the health consequences of their products.3 In the
accompanying article, Susan Greenhalgh describes how the
Coca-Cola Company came to dominate obesity policy in China
even though its influence was obscured behind the public face
of intermediaries (doi:10.1136/bmj.k5050).4
Changing the conversation
In the late 1970s, Coca-Cola took advantage of the opening of
Chinese society to the international community, exploiting the
then extremely limited opportunities for Chinese researchers to
access funds to undertake studies or to develop links with
Western counterparts. It was not, however, Coca-Cola that made
the approaches to Chinese researchers. Instead it was an
organisation called the International Life Sciences Institute—a
name that combined ideas of health, academia, and international
links while also forming a memorable acronym, ILSI. Yet ILSI
was established by a Coca-Cola executive with substantial
funding from the company.
As Greenhalgh describes, the ILSI “Focal Point in China”
(ILSI-China) has been able to exert remarkable influence on
development of obesity policy by promoting a narrative that all
foods and drinks, including those produced by Coca-Cola, could
be part of a healthy diet. What matters, it claims, is that
individuals expend the calories they ingest by taking sufficient
exercise. This was also the core message of the Global Energy
Balance Network, also set up by Coca-Cola and with members
well represented at the Chinese conferences supported by ILSI.
Coca-Cola had viewed the network as a “weapon” to “change
the conversation” about obesity to one that diverted attention
from their products in what it portrayed as a “war between the
public health community and private industry.”5
We now know that corporations make extensive use of third
parties such as ILSI to create a dominant narrative that frames
how issues are viewed and sets the boundaries within which
responses are seen as “reasonable,” while excluding the most
effective measures—especially those that harm the interests of
the corporations—from the agenda. Some have specific goals,
such as the Center for Indoor Air Research, which sought to
undermine the evidence on the dangers of secondhand smoke.6
Others use a broad based approach that includes promotion of
individual choice over collective action, supporting often
ineffective educational campaigns rather than the legal or
regulatory measures that tackle price, availability, and marketing
of their products.7 This is exemplified in the use of the term
“nanny state” to attack many of the most effective public health
measures.8 Their approach also emphasises the “complexity”
of public health problems, implying that little can be done to
tackle them, applying the same language to issues as diverse as
junk food, gambling, and asbestos.9
This approach also downplays potential conflicts of interest.
Industry funded reports contend that everyone is in some way
conflicted—for example, in holding certain political views—and
that as long as funding is declared any conflicts are easily
managed. If everyone is conflicted, there is no cause for
concern.10 Yet a wealth of evidence shows that industry funded
studies tend to reach conclusions favourable to their sponsors11
and that disclosure of funding alone is inadequate, as researchers
may exaggerate their findings and reviewers discount the
potential for bias.12
ILSI’s activities in China are similar to those it pursues
elsewhere, which have long raised concerns. In 2001 a World
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Health Organization report condemned its links to the tobacco
industry.13 A 2002 paper described ILSI’s involvement in
research partnerships as a “threat to scientific integrity.”14 Yet,
despite this information being freely available, ILSI’s 18
constituent bodies continue to be influential around the world.
Changing attitudes
There are, however, signs that attitudes are changing. Recently,
the food company Mars pulled out of ILSI, noting concern about
its “advocacy led studies” that “mostly for the right reasons,
have been criticized.”15 The new Philip Morris funded
Foundation for a Smoke Free World has attracted much adverse
comment,16 and many universities and public health associations
have stated that they will not accept funding from it. The US
National Institutes of Health has withdrawn from an alcohol
industry funded project on moderate drinking and issued new
guidelines for such partnerships.17 The UK Charity Commission
is questioning the status of some of the think tanks that have
been most active in supporting the narrative of corporations18
but refuse to publish details of their funders.19 Yet, as the recent
heavily criticised decision by Public Health England to partner
with the alcohol industry funded charity Drinkaware shows,
this message has not got through to everyone.20
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